Many studies have documented that we remember less negative information as we grow older. The present study examined the effects of view of life and selection bias on this positivity effect using an emotional picture memory task. Young adults were tested in the laboratory, and older adults were either tested in the laboratory or at home. Results confirmed a positivity effect in old age. Selection bias and view of life did not significantly influence older adults' emotional memory as predicted. Metamemory, however, was affected by selection bias: Older adults tested in the laboratory had higher self-rated memory scores than those who tested at home.
A growing literature documents evidence that older adults show a positive preference in their memory (see Mather & Carstensen, 2005 , for a review). For example, when tested on an incidental picture memory task, older adults remembered fewer pictures overall, but the age difference was greater for negative than for positive or neutral pictures, i.e., older adults remembered significantly fewer negative pictures than did young adults (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003) . In a face attention task, Mather and Carstensen (2003) found that older adults attended less to negative information, because they responded slower to a dot presented on the same side as a negative face than to a dot on the same side as a neutral face. In the same experiment, older adults also demonstrated better memory for positive than for negative faces.
This positivity effect is valid only when we compare young and older adults' memory abilities and should not be confused with a positive bias, which is the terminology used to describe findings within each age group (Langeslag & van Strien, 2009 ). Thus far, three patterns of results have been observed in the cognitive aging literature: 1) Young adults show no positive or negative bias and older adults show a positivity bias, 2) Young adults show a negativity bias and older adults show no bias, and 3) Young adults show a negativity bias and older adults show a positivity bias (Langeslag & van Strien, 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2005) .
Apart from memory, researchers have found a similar positivity effect in other paradigms, such as reviewing past choices (Mather & Johnson, 2000) and autobiographical information (Field, 1981; Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990 ). Carstensen and colleagues, using the socioemotional selectivity theory, suggested that this age-related difference in memory for emotionally valenced information is related to older adults' greater motivation than young adults to regulate emotional states (Carstensen, 1993 (Carstensen, , 1995 Carstensen & Charles, 1998; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) . According to the socioemotional selectivity theory, when one's lifetime is perceived to be limited, one pays more attention to the emotional aspects of a situation (Carstensen, 1993; Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2004) , and one invests more cognitive and behavioral resources in securing them. Emotional well-being increases with this time limit perception, not with chronological age. Similar positivity effects have been observed in young people who are terminally ill. For example, Carstensen and Fredrickson (1998) found that young males with HIV infections approaching the end of their lives mentally represent social partners in similar ways as older adults. Their goals were more focused on the present rather than on acquiring knowledge for the future. Because chronological age and time limits in life are inevitably associated with each other, age-related motivational shifts become apparent. This emotional prioritization process influences cognition and memory, and because positive states are favored over negative ones, older adults may avoid negative information by intensifying positive emotions. Thus, the positivity effect we observe in attention and memory tasks may be related to this motivational shift in emotional processing (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2004) . Understanding the cognitive and neurological bases of the positivity effect is currently a pressing topic in cogni-tive aging research. Yet, factors other than motivational, cognitive, and neurological changes associated with aging may also be related to this positivity effect. For instance, stereotype threats and attitudes regarding aging have been found to directly impact cognitive performance in older adults (see Hess, 2005 , for a review). Hess, Auman, Colcombe, and Rahhal (2003) tested young and older adults and found that, when adults were primed with negative aging materials, memory performance decreased in recall and recognition tasks compared to persons who received less negative information. Older adults' memory performance also significantly decreased as their perceived stereotype threat increased. Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, and Hasher (2005) found similar results in three separate experiments in which young and older adults were told that they were participating in either a memory test or an impression formation task. Older adults' recall and recognition performance improved when the memory nature of the test was deemphasized in the impression formation task. Furthermore, their memory performance was negatively related to their perceived stereotype threat on aging and memory.
Age stereotypes are certainly closely related to life satisfaction (Davis & Friedrich, 2010) . Aging is an inevitable process in life, so that age stereotypes toward older adults eventually impact our own personal life experiences. Holding positive or negative views about aging may in fact impact our general well-being. For example, positive self-perception of aging was found to influence longevity (Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002) . Older adults who hold more positive self-perceptions of aging lived up to 7.5 years longer than those who were less positive (Levy et al., 2002) . Although to date no study has directly examined the effects of life satisfaction on the positivity effect, research findings in the field of autobiographical memory suggest that positive memories and personal well-being are positively correlated in young and older adults (Alea & Bluck, 2003; McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008) . Since personal wellbeing and life satisfaction are closely related constructs, a relationship between the positivity effect and life satisfaction seems plausible.
Therefore, the first goal of the present study was to investigate the relationship between participants' performance on an emotional picture memory task and their view of life. In an questionnaire on aging, older adults were asked to rate their lives now compared to lives during young adulthood (20 to 30 years old). Participants who rated life now as better than life previously were considered to have a more positive attitude toward life than those who rated life as the same or worse than before. Older adults who rated life as better now than before were expected to show a stronger instance of positivity effect if view of life were to influence emotional memory like age stereotypes.
The second goal of the present study was to examine the role of participant selection bias on the positivity effect. Participant selection and attrition issues are present in almost all aging studies (Salthouse, 1982) . Older adults may drop out of a longitudinal study over time due to sickness and death; but more commonly, healthy older adults who are eligible to participate in experimental studies may forego participation because of mobility issues or responsibilities at home. Therefore, older adults who volunteer for laboratory studies are in general healthy individuals living independently, without too many immediate obligations. As a result, this self-selected sample may have a different, possibly more positive, attitude toward life than healthy older adults who are unable to participate in laboratory studies due to family commitments, decreased mobility, or other obligations. The present study explored the influence of participant selection bias on emotional memory by manipulating testing locations: participants were tested either at home or in the laboratory.
Method Participants
Participants were 47 young adults recruited from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 82 older adults recruited from Massachusetts, as well as from the Claremont and East Bay communities in Southern and Northern California, USA. All of the young adults and 48 of the older participants were tested in the laboratory, while 34 older participants were tested at home. Participants tested at home were recruited through flyers from a senior residential community in Walnut Creek, CA (Rossmoor Senior Community). Rossmoor provides independent living arrangements (apartments, condominiums, and houses) to healthy older adults above 55 years old but do not provide any medical or physical assistance. All participants were prescreened on the phone or through email on physical and mental health conditions. Older adults from Rossmoor who indicated the ability to come into the laboratory to participate in our study were tested in the laboratory instead of at their home. Therefore, the older group tested at home included only older adults who did not have the ability to travel to the laboratory or who had responsibilities at home that might have hindered their mobility.
All participants were tested individually in a quiet room, with a 15-inch laptop or desktop computer, and were paid $10/h for participation. Testing sessions lasted about 1 h per participant. English was either the participants' native language or had been learned before age 7. Participants with a self-reported history of neurological/psychiatric disorders, diabetes, stroke, or vision difficulties were excluded. During recruitment, care was taken to equate participants on health condition (self-report health questionnaire), education level (≥ 12 years), and depression status (no clinically depressed patients were allowed to participate). During testing, participants were administered the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975 ) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) for further screening. Only participants who scored 27 or above on the MMSE (no dementia) and 10 or below (no depression) on the BDI were included in the final analysis.
Four young and two older adults tested in the laboratory were excluded because their BDI scores were greater than 10. Therefore, the final analyses were conducted with 43 young and 46 older adults tested in the laboratory, as well as 34 older adults tested at home (Table 1) . Young adults performed significantly better than older adults on all cognitive measures, all t values > 2.10, all p values < .04. We included a Frequency of Forgetting questionnaire (FOF; Rasch Modeled Memory Self-Efficacy Scale; Zelinski & Gilewski, 2004) as a metamemory measure and found that young adults had higher ratings than older adults, t(121) = 2.21, p < .03. However, further analyses revealed that this significant result was solely driven by the lower average FOF score of older adults tested at home: Older adults tested in the laboratory had similar FOF scores as young adults, but significantly higher FOF ratings than those tested at home, t(79) = 3.76, p < .01. See Table 1 for more details on participants.
Materials
The stimuli were 30 pictures (10 positive, 10 neutral, 10 negative). Two filler pictures were used at the beginning and at the end of each encoding list to absorb primacy and recency effects in memory. These pictures were of objects and scenes obtained on the internet and were rated for valence and arousal on a 9-point scale by healthy and nondepressed young (ages 18-30) and older adults (ages 60-85) in a previous study (Chung, 2009) . For the valence scale, 1 = very negative and 9 = very positive; and for the arousal scale, 1 = very exciting and 9 = very calming. Table 2 shows that the mean valence and arousal rating for each category (positive, neutral, and negative) were significantly different from one another, t values > 10.70, p values < .01, but ratings were not statistically different for young and older adults, t values < 2.10, p values > .05. These pictures were equated on complexity, resolution (72 pixels/inch), and size (width: 12 inches, height: 10 inches). A sample encoding list and three sample pictures are shown in the Appendix. Two counterbalanced encoding lists were created with these pictures.
The aging questionnaire was administered at the end of each testing session to assess participants' attitudes toward life and aging. The questionnaire included the following four queries: (1) "How old do you feel (you can state an exact age)?"; (2) "Do you think your life is better now than when you were in your young adulthood (20-30 years old)? Yes/No"; (3) Please rate your quality of life now; (4) Please rate your quality of life in your 20s to 30s using a 5-point Likert scale from very poor (1) to very good (5). Following this aging questionnaire, participants completed a personality questionnaire (NEO-Five Factor Inventory; Costa & McCrae, 2003) and the FOF questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants viewed a list of positive, negative, and neutral pictures presented individually for 4 s/picture on the computer screen. They were told to view the pictures as if they were watching television, and they were not informed of the memory test that would follow. After passively viewing the pictures, the digit-span forward and backward tasks (Wechsler, 1997) were administered. After this brief 5-min delay, older participants were instructed to recall out loud the pictures they saw using brief verbal descriptions as the experimenter wrote down their responses. Like the older adults, young adults did the digit-span task but also participated in another verbal experiment in the laboratory that was unrelated to picture memory. This created a longer delay of about 30 min for the young adults, which prevented a ceiling effect in recall. After this picture task, all participants completed the BDI, NEO-FFI, FOF, and aging questionnaires. 
Statistical Analyses
Young and older adults' memory recall data were first analyzed in a mixed-factorial 2 (Age: young, old) × 3 (Valence: positive, neutral, negative) analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the presence of any positivity effect. Then, the older adults were separated into two groups based on their responses on the aging questionnaire: Group 1 included those who rated life as better now (n = 52), and group 2 included those who rated life as the same or worse than before (n = 27). The effects of view of life and selection bias were then examined in a mixed-factorial 3 (Valence: positive, neutral, negative) × 2 (Location: home, laboratory) × 2 (View of life: better now, the same/worse now) ANOVA. Figure 1 shows the pattern of recall by valence for young and older adults (locations combined). A mixed factorial 2 (Age) × 3 (Valence) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Valence, F(2, 242) = 49.60, p < .01, η 2 = .29, and interaction between Valence and Age, F(2, 242) = 5.55, p < .01, η 2 = .04. The main effect of Age was not significant, F(1, 121) = 1.00, p = .32, η 2 = .008. Posthoc t-tests showed that young adults recalled significantly more negative pictures than neutral and positive pictures, t(42) = 7.60, p < .01; t(42) = 5.72, p < .01. Older adults recalled significantly more positive pictures than neutral pictures, t(79) = 2.83, p < .01, as well as more negative pictures than neutral and positive pictures respectively, t(79) = 5.49, p < .01, t(79) = 3.24, p < .01. Furthermore, older adults recalled significantly more positive pictures than young adults, t(121) = 2.16, p < .04; but not neutral, t(121) = 1.77, p = .08, or negative pictures, t(121) = 1.46, p = .15.
Results
The effects of testing locations and older adults' view of life were then examined by comparing older adults who rated life as better now (n = 52) to those who rated life as the same or worse than before (n = 27). The two groups did not differ significantly on demographic and cognitive measures, all t values < 2.20, all p values < .05 (Table 3) . A mixed-factorial 3 (Valence) × 2 (Location) × 2 (Perception of life condition) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Valence, F(2, 150) = 13.82, p < .01, η 2 = .16, but no significant two-way or three-way interactions.
Discussion
This study examined the effects of view of life and selection bias on older adults' emotional memory pattern. The results showed a positivity effect: Older adults recalled significantly more positive pictures than did young adults in an emotional picture memory task. Testing location and selection bias, however, did not affect emotional memory performance as expected.
Positivity Effect
The positivity effect observed in the present study is quantified by a negativity bias in young adults' memory and an overall emotional enhancement effect with no bias in older adults' memory. This is the second pattern of positivity effect described in the introduction. Although this pattern of results is different from that found in Charles et al. (2003) , it is certainly one that has been observed in previous emotional memory paradigms (Mather & Carstensen, 2005;  The main difference between the present study and that of Charles et al. (2003) lies in the type of pictures used in the study phase. In Charles et al. (2003) and many other emotional picture memory studies (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Kensinger, Piguet, Krendl, & Corkin, 2005) , pictures of different categories, such as people, animals, scenes, objects, etc., were chosen from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998) . The present study, however, utilized recent objects and scenes photos found on the internet. The reason for this adaptation is that many of the pictures in the IAPS database looked "old fashioned," with most pictures in the system having been taken in the early 1990s. In a pilot study conducted with IAPS pictures, a memory enhancement effect was found for pictures that looked old fashioned rather than emotional or arousing. Therefore, a new set of experimental stimuli was created to simulate experiences close to participants' present viewing of pictures on television or the internet. Human pictures were also excluded to test the hypothesis that human faces readily elicit the positivity effect (Charles et al., 2003) . Our results show that the positivity effect is still strong even without human existence in pictures.
Also, the arousal levels of the present positive and negative pictures were different from those reported by Charles et al. (2003) . According to Charles et al. (2003) , the arousal level of negative and positive images did not vary significantly from each other, rather both were higher than the arousal scores for their neutral images. In the present study, negative pictures were the most arousing, followed by neutral and then positive pictures. Kensinger (2008) found a positivity effect in older adults' memory only for nonarousing words, suggesting that aging preserves responses to arousing information while altering the processing of nonarousing information. Thus, the present result of older adults remembering significantly more positive pictures than young adults could be attributed to the lower arousal ratings of the positive pictures.
Another difference between this study and previous emotional memory studies is the fact that young and older adults' memory performances were equated by the manipulation of filled-delay periods between encoding and recall. During the pilot phase of this study, young and older adults were given both the 5-and 30-min delay manipulations. The 5-min delay created a ceiling effect in young adults' performance, while the 30-min delay created a floor effect for older adults. With a combination of these two delay periods, 5-min for young and 30-min for older adults, the age-related memory effect was eliminated and created a pure comparison of emotional differences. This delay manipulation, however, could have allowed for different semantic categorization of the encoded pictures. Because of the prominent negativity bias in young adults' memory (e.g., Charles et al., 2003) , the most salient pictures after 30 min of unintentional cognitive organization would likely be negative ones. When compared to older adults, young adults showed an obvious bias for recalling negative information, with a lower recall rate for neutral pictures and a significantly lower recall for positive pictures compared to negative recall. The much lower recall rate for positive pictures in young adults subsequently contributed to the significant age-related difference in positive picture recall because older adults did not show a positive or a negative bias.
The older adults' -albeit not statistically significantgreater neutral picture recall than young adults indicated that perhaps the delay manipulation was not ideal. Performance correction by neutral recall would eliminate the positivity effect observed in the present study. Thus, future studies should employ a slightly longer delay for older adults to further equate performance between the two age groups.
Furthermore, although many studies demonstrated an age-related positivity effect, several studies reported no such effect (e.g., Comblain, D'Argembeau, Van der Linden, & Aldenhoff, 2004; Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003; Gruhn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005; Kensinger, Brierly, Medford, Growdon, & Corkin, 2002) . Tomaszczyk, Fernandes, and MacLeod (2008) investigated the reason for these mixed results and found that personal relevance of the pictures used in encoding may play a big role in participants' emotional responses. When pictures were grouped into low-and high-personal relevance, the positivity effect was only observed for low-relevance pictures. It is, therefore, possible that the pictures used in the present study were different in personal relevance than those used in Charles et al. (2003) , so that the positivity effect pattern differed too.
View of Life and Selection Bias
Older participants were categorized into two separate groups based on their aging questionnaire responses: (1) life is better now and (2) life is the same or worse than before. Older adults who rated life as better now had similar emotional memory performance as those who rated life as the same or worse than before. Older adults tested in the laboratory and at home also did not differ on their memory performance.
Although age stereotypes have been found to directly impact older adults' memory performance (e.g., Chasteen et al., 2005; Hess, 2005) , the present study shows that a closely related concept -view of life or life satisfactionmay not directly map onto older adults' emotional memory performance. Davis and Friedrich (2010) showed that age stereotypes and life satisfaction are related constructs, but that life satisfaction is difficult to define. Most of the life satisfaction questionnaires in the literature address medical concerns in old age, e.g., Life Satisfaction Questionnaire (Carlsson & Hamrin, 2002) , rather than the practicalities of living conditions and technology, nor do they compare life now to several decades ago. The present study sought to capture the comparison of time in history rather than merely getting a rating of quality of life in the present. But the scope of the present aging questionnaire might have been too broad to capture such an intricate relationship between view of life and emotional memory. Participants could have rated their quality of life now and before based on several different dimensions, e.g., health, technology, and living conditions. Without the subcategorization of their responses, it was difficult to operationally define "life is better now" and vice versa. Future studies should include additional questions regarding health, technology, and living conditions to further explore the impact of view of life on emotional memory.
Older adults tested in the laboratory and at home also did not differ on their memory performance. However, older adults tested in the laboratory had higher Frequency of Forgetting (FOF) scores than those tested at home. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that older adults tested in the laboratory may hold a more positive attitude than those unable to participate in laboratory studies. This metamemory difference, however, did not translate into significant memory differences on the emotional memory picture task. Yet, surprisingly, older adults tested in the laboratory had similar FOF scores as young adults. In most of the metamemory literature, older adults have always been shown to hold more negative beliefs about their memory than young adults (e.g., Dixon & Hultsch, 1983; Gilewski, Zelinski, & Schaie, 1990; Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1987) . Older adults are also considered more likely to say that their memory has changed for the worse (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983; Gilewski et al., 1990; Hultsch et al., 1987) , even though their perception of memory decline may not map onto their actual memory performance (Chaffin & Herrmann, 1983 ). The present finding of similar FOF scores in young and older adults tested in the laboratory suggests that being independent and mobile in old age may boost older adults' confidence about their cognition. This interesting finding should be further explored in future studies.
As the general population grows older, it is becoming more and more pressing for us to understand age-related changes in cognition and motivation. The present study sheds light on the understanding of the positivity effect in old age, which is a well-documented phenomenon in the cognitive aging literature. A significant positivity effect in old age was found to be unrelated to view of life or selection bias. Selection bias, however, did affect participants' metamemory.
